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n her 1970 classic The Sovereignty of Good, Iris 
Murdoch said, “We need a moral philosophy in which 
the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by 
philosophers, can once again be made central.” Since then, a 
number of philosophers—prominent among them Irving 
Singer, Alan Soble, Martha Nussbaum, Harry Frankfurt, 
Luce Irigaray, and Emmanuel Levinas—have made an 
attempt, if not quite to centralize love in moral discourse, at 
least to give love serious consideration. In feminist 
philosophy, since the beginning of the ethics of care in the 
1980s, something like love—if the act of caring is loving 
action—has taken center stage. De Vries and Schott have 
I 
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added their voice to the conversation with an important, but 
sometimes difficult, collection of essays, an interview, and a 
poem, creatively linking love with forgiveness. 
 
Nonetheless, it remains true that love is marginalized in 
mainstream social and political philosophy, and considered 
an impracticality—mere sentimentalism—that is ill-suited 
for the rigors of realpolitik in a world dominated, since at 
least Sept 11, 2001, by the threat and actuality of terrorism, 
civil wars, and insurgences.  
 
De Vries, Schott and their authors challenge this, claiming 
that, on the contrary love and forgiveness must become 
central for the world to be made well. Such is not a novel 
idea, of course, and has noble genealogy in the West from 
Socrates, the Jewish prophets and Jesus to the medieval 
mystics, the Muslim Sufis, and on to Martin Luther King Jr. 
who said love was central in his quest for civil rights and the 
Beloved Community, and Desmond Tutu who made much of 
forgiveness in the process of Truth and Reconciliation in 
South Africa. In the East the genealogy of love includes 
Mozi, Zhuangzi, the Buddha, Confucius (if ren, 
humaneness, is loving concern), the Jains, and on to M.K. 
Gandhi.  
 
In their foreword, the editors provide the reader with a 
leitmotif that runs through the book—alertness. They 
suggest that is the the practice of “vigilant attentiveness … 
attunement to others, awareness of difference, and the 
patient cultivation of nascent relations, emerging 
communities” that love and forgiveness provide (2). Yet, the 
relationship between love and forgiveness is not an obvious 
one. The several authors try to make this shadowy 
relationship clear, optimistically as a way through “empirical 
impasse and moral fatigue” (17) with regard to “historical 
and ontological immanence, war and violence, closed and 
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static mindsets.” Thus, love and forgiveness provide an 
“alert” to the possibilities of what it means to be human 
amidst the existential difficulties of the real world.  
 
The collection begins with an ironic and winsome poem by 
Haleh Liza Gafori, “Orange Alert,” woven around the theme 
of “terror alerts,” so prevalent in the months and years after 
September 11, 2001. “I am so tired of terror!’” says the 
author.  
 
Orange alert, really? 
How about a russet alert, 
A coral alert, sienna alert, 
A burnt ochre , vermilion alert, 
A salmon, pumpkin, persimmon alert, 
A rust carrot apricot alert, a saffron alert! (24-
25) 
 
The author leads us to see that under the alert are 
relationships with people of many colors, and under “the 
color of my skin is a soul”: 
 
Alert me, alert us to this possibility 
As we cross the sacred, wretched, swirling 
river. (26) 
 
Jean-Luc Marion’s first short chapter follows the poem and 
alerts us to the possibility that love is “not a passion; it is a 
point of view” (28). According to Marion the modern 
conception of love, from Descartes to the twentieth century, 
is like that of a disease—something that happens to you, not 
something that you decide. This he calls “the erotic 
reduction.” He suggests that with love I am no longer the 
center, for the center is where the beloved is. I only find 
myself when I am in the space occupied by the one I love 
(29). Descartes’ cogito is transformed from “I think 
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therefore I am” to “I am insofar as I am thought” (30). We 
exist only insofar as we are lovingly acknowledged by 
another. Forgiveness, like love, is a gift that we give to the 
other, and in the giving “the giver has to disappear” (33). In 
this way, love and forgiveness are “not an economic 
exchange, but a way of opening up a completely different 
world” (34).  
 
Jean-Luc Marion’s second piece in the collection is a short 
interview with him by Hugues Choplin, with regard to 
power, giving a glimpse into the possibilities of the 
“completely different world.” Dismissing the continued 
usefulness of the concept of power Marion introduces the 
concept of “unpower”—“that which intervenes when the 
description of phenomenon can or even must dispense with 
the concept of power because this concept turns out to be 
inoperable in practice” (41). Neither Choplin nor Marion 
spell out the implications of this for love, the editors leaving 
the reader to make the connection. My best guess—and only 
a guess—is that in political terms the concept of power, 
either as authority or force, is inoperable when practice 
moves beyond mere power relationships toward loving 
forgiveness. To speak of force or authority when considering 
love or forgiveness makes little sense. For political discourse 
to move beyond power toward love requires a major shift.  
 
Regina M. Schwartz in her “Revenge, Forgiveness and 
Love” critiques the kind of justice that is satisfied by 
harming another through punishment; that is though 
retribution. She asks “There seems to be a widespread 
intuition that just as those who do good should be rewarded, 
so those who do harm should be punished. But why? On 
what grounds?” She answers, “It turns out that such 
intuitions rest on surprisingly little grounding” (44). Using 
Plato’s Socrates (Republic 335e) and Martin Luther King Jr., 
Schwartz argues that to harm someone, in the belief that one 
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harm following another harm somehow balances the first 
harm, is foolish. Evil deeds are not redeemed by evil deeds. 
Such violent harms become a descending spiral, humiliate 
the opponent— sometimes annihilate—rather than convert, 
and creates a world of bitterness and brutality. For Plato 
people tend to become worse in virtue when harmed. They 
become even worse in virtue when doing the harm.  
 
Using Shakespeare’s Hamlet as “the greatest revenge 
tragedy in English drama” (49) Schwartz demonstrates that 
Hamlet is actually an antirevenge tragedy— and not only 
Hamlet. In Othello, Romeo and Juliet, Troilus and Cressida, 
and King Lear, “Shakepeare’s plays not only condemn 
revenge. They endorse forgiveness …” (55). Further, for 
Shakespeare, forgiveness is not only the alternative to 
revenge, but is tied also to the discovery of love, for “love 
defines us as human” (56). As such, love is not merely 
private but preeminently public, “it is social glue … it is 
tantamount to justice.”  
 
Schwartz’s account of forgiveness is robust and moves 
beyond a psychological account of the victim’s letting go of 
bitterness and resentment, toward the positive goal of 
restoration between parties. She says: 
 
Forgiveness is not a unilateral act. It involves 
two: it is a response to apology. Nor is it an 
isolated act: it is part of a process that 
includes the acknowledgment of 
wrongdoing, remorse and apology from the 
perpetrator and the response of forgiveness 
from the injured. (57) 
 
Further, “the duty of the offender to seek forgiveness is 
primary and unconditional, while the duty to grant it is 
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conditional upon the offender’s having fulfilled her prior 
duty” (58).  
 
Leora Batnitzky’s “Love and Law” is a careful comparison 
of aspects of Judaism and Calvinism arguing that, for both 
religions, love and law go hand in hand. The author suggests 
this in contradistinction to some interpretations that see 
Judaism as typified by law, and Christianity by love. Both 
religions are rooted in the notion of covenant between God 
and community, in the absolute sovereignty of God, and in 
the election of a particular people by God. The religions 
differ in their understanding of humanity. For Judaism 
humanity is “all too human, for better and for worse” (85). 
For Calvinism, at least as taught by Abraham Kuyper, 
humanity is corrupted by sin, yet by God’s “special” grace 
can become “Godlike” (85). Special grace, though is 
reserved for the elect and only the elect. The rest of humanity 
receive only God’s “common” grace, which allows natural 
loving human interactions to continue (such as the mother’s 
love of a child). Batnitzky suggests that Judaism’s creation 
by a loving God and Calvinism’s common grace are 
functionally the same. The ideas allow the squaring of the 
circle, reconciling election and universalism, and answer the 
question “How can Calvinism (or Judaism) live in a world 
in which everyone is not Calvinist (or Jewish)?” (86).  
 
Batnitzky’s positive assessment of both religions, moving 
them beyond the merely parochial toward the universal is 
helpful for members of those religions who seek a more 
expansive vision. However, as neither a Calvinist nor 
Jewish, and I assume, not among the elect, this piece leaves 
me with questions. It suggests remaining validity in an 
exclusive religion that sees its adherents as, in some way, 
chosen by God in ways that other people are not. For me it 
is just a tad “us and them,” rather than “we together,” which 
is surely a more hopeful and loving future for the world.  
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Volume editor Nils F. Schott adds his piece on love and 
community in St. Augustine, “A Mother to All.” Central to 
Augustine’s account is that “love unfolds in a community” 
(88). Schott understands Augustine as seeing the coming of 
Christ as “the coming or intervention of love” (90). Love is 
God’s gift and not an acquisition on the part of the one loved. 
Perhaps strangely, the precursor to accepting the gift is 
fear—fear of God without which the would be recipient of 
God’s love is indifferent (92). With fear the believer turns 
from self-love—a kind of love disparaged and punished by 
God—to the love of God. In this way “fear is intricately tied 
to love” (94). In Augustine love is also hierarchical. The love 
of the superior for the inferior is a better type of love because 
it “does not want anything” (97 italics original). Superior 
love arises out of plenty; inferior love arises out of need. The 
Christian catechetical task is to use fear and love as threat 
and promise to remove obstacles in the way of receiving 
God’s superior love. According to Schott, this only happens 
in a community, in loving others and being loved, in which 
community members “catch a glimpse of the immensity of 
the love of God” (106).  
 
There follows two essays from the psychoanalytic point of 
view: Orna Ophir’s Looking Evil in the Eye/I and Albert 
Mason’s “Beyond Right and Wrong.” Ophir’s piece on 
forgiveness argues that in order to forgive, one must look 
courageously at the evil inside oneself. She says: 
 
Looking in the “eye of evil” implies, 
precisely, not evading the full bleakness and 
terror of one’s own impulses of life and 
death. Eros and Thanatos, libido and 
aggression. Looking evil in the eye thus 
demands, first and foremost, looking evil in 
the I, that is to say, continuously observing 
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and confronting the violence and harm at the 
heart of one’s self.” (110, italics original) 
 
Ophir argues that the process of forgiveness requires firstly 
facing one’s own “murderous demons” and their desire to 
destroy, and secondly differentiating oneself from these 
demons and giving up their will for destruction (113). The 
process is complex and may involve fantasies of revenge 
that, paradoxically, help facilitate forgiveness. “Exploring 
them imaginatively and unreservedly, thinking them 
through, instead of acting on them, makes one’s own sadistic 
fantasies potentially curative” (115 italics original). Ophir 
uses Melanie Klein to suggest that love, too, cannot be 
considered without first exploring destructive impulses 
(119), moving from the paranoid-schizoid position to the 
depressive one (125). That is, one perceives the other as 
separate from one’s self, finds a sadness for damaged 
relationships together with an urge to repair, and ultimately 
begins to love.  
 
Albert Mason, similarly uses Klein’s paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive positions, to articulate the necessary movement 
from “us-them” “good people-bad people” to a more 
integrated understanding that all people are both good and 
bad. When love and hate merge to produce understanding 
(Klein’s depressive position) forgiveness can take place. 
Without this movement it is far easier to “split off our own 
badness and project it into others than to own our own faults 
and go through the slow, painful, and difficult process of 
correcting them” (131). The human defense is to project all 
of one’s badness on to the other, and to appropriate all the 
other’s goodness on to oneself. However, when one 
identifies the bad in one’s self, then forgiveness is possible 
because identification with the other has taken place. Mason 
says: 
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Forgiveness essentially consists in a reversal 
of the process of dehumanization. We must 
first see our perpetrator as human by 
integrating the split view of him as a monster 
and seeing the whole person with his bad and 
good qualities, just like ourselves” (133). 
 
Mason rehearses the feature of psychoanalysis that painful 
traumas and experiences are buried in the unconscious—
suppressed—and continue to have effects such as 
depression, until the trauma is made conscious through 
psychoanalysis and worked through. Though Mason 
represents this as fact, I simply note that that the theory of 
repressed traumatic memories continues to be debated by 
scholars.  
 
The shortest piece in the collection are remarks by Jacques 
Derrida who says simply, “I have an empty head on love in 
general. And, as for the reason philosophy has spoken of 
love, I either have nothing to say or I’d just be reciting 
clichés” (142).  
 
In his longer piece “To Forgive,” Derrida considers the 
question of whether one ought always to forgive, using the 
work of Russian, Jewish philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch. 
He introduces the notion of the duty of unforgiveness in the 
name of the victims (151). Included in this are two axioms: 
first, forgiveness can only be contemplated when 
forgiveness is asked for; and second when a crime is so 
serious that it crosses the line into radical evil, then 
forgiveness can no longer be possible. Forgiveness, then, 
should only be permitted on the part of the victim, in “head-
to-head or face-to-face” exchanges and never by a third party 
(159).  
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Sari Nusseibeh’s “Thoughts on Love” brings a helpful 
perspective from the fourteenth-century Arab sociologist Ibn 
Khaldun, seeing compassion as being: 
 
[T]he primal instinct a mother has for her 
loved one or that someone has for a blood 
relative—the instinct that explains that 
person’s readiness to put him- or herself in 
harm’s way lest that harm reach their 
beloved. (184) 
 
Nusseibeh argues that this primal love (compassion) is the 
basis for peace and justice. A political model rooted in love 
and compassion would be better than one linked to self-
serving, fear for the self and fear of others (186).  
 
Along the way, Nusseibeh poses an interesting challenge to 
the commonly asserted “you must love yourself first, before 
you can love others,” and even Harry Frankfurt’s notion that 
self-love is the purest form of love, in this way: 
 
To love oneself, first of all, seems to 
presuppose two selves, the lover and the 
loved. And if a conceptually necessary 
feature of loving the other is selflessness, or 
holding a concern for the other above that for 
oneself, then would not self-love be reduced 
to an unfathomable unconcerned concern? 
(188) 
 
The final piece in the collection, “The Passionate Utterance 
of Love,” by volume editor Hent de Vries, was, for this 
reviewer, the most dense and unfathomable chapter. The 
author summarizes the earlier argument by Jean-Luc Marion 
regarding the phenomenon of love, adding his own gloss, 
and covers the mysticism and powerlessness of love, texts 
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and images, the utterance “I love you,” insincerity, and 
pragmatism. But this chapter is no easy read, and the 
argument extremely complex. It is not helped by a style of 
writing unfamiliar to most readers—long sentences with 
numerous sub-clauses. The chapter begins with a ninety-
four-word sentence, and continues in the same vein 
throughout. The final sentence to the chapter has one 
hundred and thirty words. In all seriousness, its meaning was 
lost to me by the time I had reached the end of the sentence. 
I read and re-read the sentence several times, still struggling. 
This is a pity, as I’m sure hidden in the verbiage is an 
interesting commentary on Marion and an important 
argument. However, perhaps the complexity of the last 
chapter is intentional, and might speak to the 
transcategorical and unutterable nature of love. I leave that 
for the reader to decide!  
 
All in all, this is a worthy addition to the literature on love 
and forgiveness. Its chapters are uneven in length and depth 
of subject, wide-ranging in their scope, and as such it will 
provide most readers with puzzles to ponder, and morsels to 
savor. As its editors suggest, Love and Forgiveness is an 
alert toward a more just world. 
